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THE LEGALITY OF HATCH-WAXMAN 
PHARMACEUTICAL SETTLEMENTS: IS THE 
TERAZOSIN TEST THE PROPER PRESCRIPTION? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1984, Congress enacted the Drug Price Competition and Patent 
Term Restoration Act,1 commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman Act,2 in 
order to increase the availability of low-cost generic drugs by creating a 
less costly generic drug approval process.3 By most accounts, the Hatch-
Waxman Act has been successful.4 As of 1983, merely thirty-five percent 
of the best-selling drugs with expired patents had generic counterparts, 
whereas now nearly all do.5 Moreover, it is estimated that in 1994 alone, 
Americans saved between eight and ten billion dollars by switching from 
brand-name to generic drugs.6 The Hatch-Waxman Act has succeeded 
because it combines an expedited Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
approval process for generic drugs with additional intellectual property 
protections for brand-name, or pioneer, drugs, thereby satisfying the 
desires of both the generic and pioneer pharmaceutical industries.7 
Notwithstanding the Hatch-Waxman Act’s apparent success, the high 
cost of pharmaceuticals continues to be a source of concern.8 A recent 
University of Connecticut poll found that seventy-seven percent of 
 
 
 1. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 
Stat. 1585 (1984). This law is codified “in scattered sections of 15, 21, 28, and 35 U.S.C.” Larissa 
Burford, Note, In re Cardizem & Valley Drug Co.: The Hatch-Waxman Act, Anticompetitive Actions, 
and Regulatory Reform, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 365, 365 n.2 (2004).  
 2. See Burford, supra note 1, at 365 n.2 (“This Act is typically referred to as the Hatch-Waxman 
Act because of the congressional sponsors, Senator Orrin Hatch and Representative Henry Waxman.”).  
 3. H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, at 14 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647 (“The purpose 
of Title I of the bill is to make available more low cost generic drugs by establishing a generic drug 
approval procedure for pioneer drugs first approved after 1962.”). 
 4. See, e.g., Timothy J. Muris, Chairman of Federal Trade Commission, Prepared Statement 
Before the Senate Judiciary Committee (June 17, 2003), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/06/030617 
pharmtestimony.htm. 
 5. Congressional Budget Office, How Increased Competition From Generic Drugs Has Affected 
Prices and Returns in the Pharmaceutical Industry, at xii (July 1998), http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc. 
cfm?index=655&sequence=0.  
 6. Id. at xiii.  
 7. See, e.g., Muris, supra note 4. 
 8. See, e.g., Howard Fine, Drugmakers Under Fire: The Pharmaceutical Industry is on the 
Defensive as Government Officials and Consumers Decry Rising Costs Amid a Furor Over Safety, 
L.A. BUS. J., Sept. 5, 2005, at 21 (addressing attempts in California to pass a measure requiring drug 
companies “to negotiate with the state to lower prices for the uninsured or be barred from lucrative 
Medi-Cal contracts”).  
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respondents believed that prescription drugs cost too much, and seventy 
percent believed that drug company profits were too high.9 Additionally, 
the presence of cheaper drugs in other nations has fueled the perception 
that Americans are being gouged10 and has spurred calls for legislation 
allowing the importation of pharmaceuticals from abroad.11 
Although no single factor accounts for high drug costs, one problem is 
that the complex Hatch-Waxman Act contains loopholes that give pioneer 
drug manufacturers and their generic counterparts incentives to enter into 
allegedly collusive settlements.12 Specifically, “pioneer brand-name drug 
companies are paying generic drug companies, which challenge the brand-
name drug patents, not to compete or to delay litigation.”13 Settlement 
payments of this type are often referred to as “reverse,” “exit,” or 
“exclusion” payments.14 At first glance, exit payment settlements would 
seem to violate antitrust laws: agreements between competitors to divide 
the market and exclude other competitors are per se illegal under Section 1 
of the Sherman Act.15 However, most brand-name drugs are subject to one 
or more patents, and the presence of patents alters the antitrust analysis.16 
 
 
 9. Id.  
 10. Id. According to the article, California Attorney General Bill Lockyer is “dragging these drug 
companies into the court of law because they’re gouging the public on basic life necessities.” Id.  
 11. See Pharmaceutical Market Access Act of 2005, S.109, 109th Cong. (2005). The need for a 
ready supply of low-cost drugs became a national security concern following the anthrax attacks in 
2001. See, e.g., Daniel R. Cahoy, Treating the Legal Side Effects of Cipro: A Reevaluation of 
Compensation Rules for Government Takings of Patent Rights, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 125, 126 (2002) 
(noting that in the wake of the anthrax threat, public attention focused on the fact that the patent rights 
to ciprofloxacin, the only antibiotic approved by the FDA to treat inhalation anthrax, were held by the 
German pharmaceutical company Bayer, who had the right to exclude all other companies from 
manufacturing or selling the drug in the United States). Similarly, fears of a “bird flu” epidemic have 
caused policymakers to pay even closer attention to the supply of cheap pharmaceuticals. Sabin 
Russel, Flu Drug Maker Won’t Share Patent: Roche Rejects Calls to Allow Production of Generic 
Versions, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 13, 2005, at A1, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi? 
file=/c/a/2005/10/13/MNG39F7MNG1.DTL& type=health (discussing fears that Roche’s refusal to 
license generic versions of its antiviral drug Tamiflu could lead to shortages of the drug should a bird 
flu epidemic break out).  
 12. Burford, supra note 1, at 365.  
 13. Marcy L. Lobanoff, Comment, Anti-Competitive Agreements Cloaked as “Settlements” 
Thwart the Purposes of the Hatch-Waxman Act, 50 EMORY L.J. 1331, 1338 (2001).  
 14. See Daniel A. Crane, Ease Over Accuracy in Assessing Patent Settlements, 88 MINN. L. REV. 
698, 698–99 (2004). The term “exit payments” will be used throughout this Note. 
 15. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 277 F. Supp. 2d 121, 128 (E.D.N.Y. 2003), aff’d, 
429 F.3d 370 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[A]n agreement between a monopolist and a potential competitor to 
divide between them and exclude other competition is per se illegal under Section 1 [of the Sherman 
Act].”).  
 16. See, e.g., Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1305 (11th Cir. 2003) (“A 
patent grants its owner the lawful right to exclude others.”).  
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Exit payments, therefore, lie at the thorny intersection of antitrust and 
patent law.17 
Because pioneer-generic settlement agreements might not violate 
antitrust laws if the patents on the drugs are valid,18 two important 
questions are raised when assessing the legality of such settlements.19 The 
first is whether courts, when addressing the legality of exit payment 
settlements in antitrust cases, should inquire into the validity of the patents 
involved. Assuming that the answer to the first question is yes,20 the 
second question is how courts should go about making such an inquiry.21  
This Note will be limited to addressing the latter of the two questions. 
Part II begins with a discussion of the history and purpose behind the 
Hatch-Waxman Act and how drug companies have allegedly attempted to 
exploit its loopholes. I will also briefly outline relevant antitrust and patent 
law concepts. In Part III, I will first summarize the arguments supporting 
the idea that antitrust courts should undertake a limited inquiry into the 
merits of the patents involved in exit payment settlements. I will then 
argue that that the novel approach taken by the court in In re Terazosin 
Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation (“Terazosin”), though flawed in some 
ways, balances the competing concerns of antitrust and patent law.22 
 
 
 17. See Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Analysis of Patent Settlements Between Rivals, ANTITRUST, 
Summer 2003, at 70 (“[P]atent settlements between rivals have become an important battleground in 
the perennial tension between intellectual property and antitrust.”). 
 18. See, e.g., Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1064 (11th Cir. 2005) (“In the 
context of patent litigation, . . . the anticompetitive effect [of excluding competitors] may be no more 
broad than the patent’s own exclusionary power.”).  
 19. It should be noted that courts do not find patents “valid.” Rather, the best a court can do is 
determine that the patent in question is “not invalid” based on the issues raised. For simplicity’s sake, 
however, in this paper the words “valid” and “not invalid” will be used interchangeably. 
 20. Several scholars have argued persuasively that as a theoretical matter, courts addressing the 
antitrust implications of Hatch-Waxman settlements should indeed look at the validity of the patents 
involved. See generally Thomas F. Cotter, Refining the “Presumptive Illegality” Approach to 
Settlements of Patent Disputes Involving Reverse Payments: A Commentary on Hovenkamp, Janis & 
Lemley, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1789 (2003); Daniel A. Crane, Exit Payments in Settlement of Patent 
Infringement Lawsuits: Antitrust Rules and Economic Implications, 54 FLA. L. REV. 747 (2002); 
Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark Janis & Mark A. Lemley, Anticompetitive Settlement of Intellectual 
Property Disputes, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1719, 1735 (2003) (“Permitting ex post judicial queries into the 
validity and coverage of settled patents may sound onerous, and may sometimes even be a deal 
breaker. But it is necessary in our ‘middle set’ of cases in order to distinguish pro- from 
anticompetitive agreements.”); Kevin D. McDonald, Hatch-Waxman Patent Settlements and Antitrust: 
On “Probabilistic” Patent Rights and False Positives, ANTITRUST, Spring 2003, at 68; Carl Shapiro, 
Antitrust Limits to Patent Settlements, 34 RAND J. ECON. 391 (2003); see also infra Part III.A. But see 
Alden F. Abbott & Suzanne T. Michel, The Right Balance of Competition Policy and Intellectual 
Property Law: A Perspective on Settlements of Pharmaceutical Patent Litigation, 46 IDEA 1 (2005).  
 21. See infra Part III.  
 22. In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 352 F. Supp. 2d 1279 (S.D. Fla. 2005), 
enforcing Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2003). This Note focuses 
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Finally, in Part IV, I will offer some suggestions for how the Terazosin 
approach can be improved—namely, that it should be applied only in 
certain limited situations and that it should be incorporated into antitrust 
law’s “rule of reason.”23  
II. HISTORY 
A. The Hatch-Waxman Act 
1. Pre-Hatch-Waxman Regulation of the Pharmaceutical Industry 
Under federal law, no new drug can be marketed or sold in the United 
States without first having been approved by the FDA.24 Between 1938 
and 1962, FDA approval was relatively easy to achieve.25 At that time, the 
law required pioneer drug manufacturers to submit to the FDA a New 
Drug Application (NDA) containing drug safety information.26 Marketing 
of the drug could begin sixty days after the manufacturer submitted the 
NDA to the FDA, unless the FDA disapproved of the drug during this 
period.27  
The FDA drug approval process became more complicated, however, 
with the passage of the Drug Amendments of 1962.28 These amendments 
required that prior to marketing, all new drugs, generic and pioneer, must 
be approved as safe and effective.29 Because testing the safety and efficacy 
of new drugs required manufacturers to conduct costly and time-
consuming tests on human subjects,30 the new NDA procedures 
contributed to a sharp increase in drug prices.31 Similarly, the increased 
 
 
on the opinion of the district court on remand from the Eleventh Circuit in Valley Drug Co., not on the 
previous opinion also called In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, that the Eleventh 
Circuit reversed. See infra Part III.B. 
 23. See infra Part IV.  
 24. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2000) (“No person shall introduce or deliver for introduction into 
interstate commerce any new drug, unless an approval of an application filed pursuant to subsection 
(b) or (j) of this section is effective with respect to such drug.”). 
 25. See Roche Prod., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 864 (Fed. Cir. 1984).  
 26. Id. at 864.  
 27. See, e.g., Stephanie Greene, A Prescription For Change: How the Medicare Act Revises 
Hatch-Waxman to Speed Market Entry of Generic Drugs, 30 J. CORP. L. 309, 313 (2005).  
 28. Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (1962) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).  
 29. H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, at 16 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2649. This is 
in contrast to the pre-1962 situation, where safety, but not efficacy, studies were required for FDA 
approval. Id.  
 30. Id. 
 31. Greene, supra note 27, at 314.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss2/4
p429 Graham book pages.doc11/20/2006  
 
 
 
 
 
2006] THE LEGALITY OF HATCH-WAXMAN SETTLEMENTS 433 
 
 
 
 
testing requirements led to a delay of over three years between the 
submission of a NDA and its approval.32 As for generic drugs, the 1962 
amendments required that generic drug manufacturers also submit safety 
and efficacy studies, “even if such studies had already been performed for 
identical drugs or drugs with identical active ingredients.”33 Furthermore, 
generic drug manufacturers could not conduct safety and efficacy studies 
involving another’s patented drug without subjecting themselves to 
liability for patent infringement.34  
Thus, by 1984 both pioneer drug manufacturers and their generic 
competitors were lobbying for FDA reform.35 Generic drug manufacturers 
argued that because using patented drugs for research was considered 
infringing activity, no generic drugs could be produced until the patents in 
question expired, thus extending the patent holder’s monopoly position.36 
Moreover, redundant safety and efficacy studies were prohibitively 
expensive,37 if not unethical.38 Patent holders, on the other hand, argued 
that because they could not sell the patented drugs until after FDA 
approval, the drug testing regime effectively deprived them of years of 
patent protection.39 
 
 
 32. See id. at 313–14. In addition, there is some evidence that by the early 1980s it could take 
from seven to ten years for a pharmaceutical company to satisfy regulatory requirements. Roche Prod., 
Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 864 (Fed. Cir. 1984).  
 33. Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1296 (11th Cir. 2003). However, the 
1962 amendments did allow for expedited approval of generic drugs that were based on “new” drugs 
approved prior to 1962. H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, at 16, as reported in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2649. 
Specifically, as part of an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA), “a manufacturer of a generic 
drug must conduct tests that show the generic drug is the same as the pioneer drug and that it will be 
properly manufactured and labeled.” Id. Still, there was “no ANDA procedure for approving generic 
equivalents of pioneer drugs approved after 1962.” Id. This ANDA procedure foreshadows the one 
that would later be created by the Hatch-Waxman Act. See infra text accompanying note 41. 
 34. Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1296. In Roche Prod., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., the Federal Circuit 
held that the “limited use of a patented drug for testing and investigation strictly related to FDA drug 
approval requirements” by anyone other than the patentee was actionable patent infringement. Roche 
Prod., Inc., 733 F.2d at 861. 
 35. See Greene, supra note 27, at 313. 
 36. Id.  
 37. See Lobanoff, supra note 13, at 1333 (“Relying on the clinical trials already approved by the 
FDA for the brand-name drugs . . . could have saved the generic manufacturers time, effort, and 
money.”).  
 38. H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, at 16 (1984), as reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 3647, 2649 (“[R]etesting is 
unethical because it requires that some sick patients take placebos and be denied treatment known to 
be effective.”). 
 39. See Greene, supra note 27, at 313.  
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2. The Hatch-Waxman Act 
To solve the problems associated with the FDA approval process, 
Congress enacted the Hatch-Waxman Act in 1984.40 The law created an 
Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) that allowed generic drug 
manufacturers to “piggyback” on a pioneer drug’s safety and efficacy 
studies.41 Moreover, the Hatch-Waxman Act modified the definition of 
patent infringement so that conducting safety and efficacy studies for FDA 
approval was no longer considered an infringing activity.42 In order to 
placate pioneer drug manufacturers, the Hatch-Waxman Act also extended 
the term of a patent to compensate for the time when a patented drug was 
undergoing the FDA approval process and could not be marketed.43 By 
enacting the Hatch-Waxman Act, Congress attempted to induce name-
brand pharmaceutical firms to make the investments necessary to research 
and develop new drug products, while simultaneously enabling 
competitors to bring cheaper, generic copies of those drugs to market.”44 
Under the original Hatch-Waxman Act, an NDA applicant was 
required to submit with his or her NDA the number and expiration date of 
any patent(s) that claimed the drug for which the applicant sought FDA 
approval.45 The FDA then published this patent information, along with 
other drug information, in what is popularly known as the “Orange 
Book.”46 Essentially, NDA applicants have to list information on patents 
that a generic manufacturer might infringe when copying the pioneer 
drug.47  
In order for a generic manufacturer to piggyback off a drug listed in the 
Orange Book, the generic manufacturer first has to provide information 
showing that that the generic drug is the same as the brand-name drug to 
be copied.48 Next, an ANDA applicant must make one of four 
 
 
 40. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 
Stat. 1585 (1984).  
 41. Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1296 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 42. See, e.g., id. at 1296. 
 43. Id. 
 44. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 2d 188, 192 (E.D.N.Y. 
2003) (quoting Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. Shalala, 81 F. Supp. 2d 30, 32 (D.D.C. 2000)).  
 45. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2000). 
 46. See Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1297. 
 47. Id. 
 48. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(j)(2)(A)(i)-(v) (2003). To be considered the same as the FDA-
approved drug it is copying, a generic drug must have the same active ingredients, route of 
administration, dosage form, strength, and labeling as the FDA-approved drug. 21 U.S.C. 
§ 355(j)(2)(A)(i)-(v). Further, the two drugs must be bioequivalent. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss2/4
p429 Graham book pages.doc11/20/2006  
 
 
 
 
 
2006] THE LEGALITY OF HATCH-WAXMAN SETTLEMENTS 435 
 
 
 
 
certifications for each of the pertinent patents listed in the Orange Book.49 
In what is known as a “paragraph IV” certification, the ANDA applicant 
certifies that the patent covering the approved drug “is invalid or will not 
be infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale” of the generic drug.50 
Making a paragraph IV certification has important legal ramifications. The 
ANDA applicant must notify the holder of the listed patent that an ANDA 
has been filed containing a paragraph IV certification.51  
Because the filing of a paragraph IV ANDA is considered by statute to 
be constructive patent infringement,52 the patent holder then has forty-five 
days after receipt of notice to file a patent infringement suit against the 
ANDA applicant.53 If the patent holder does not bring suit within forty-
five days, the FDA may approve the ANDA immediately.54 Alternatively, 
if the patent holder does file a patent infringement suit within the forty-
five-day window, an automatic thirty-month stay of FDA approval of the 
ANDA is granted.55 The FDA cannot approve the ANDA until the end of 
the thirty-month stay, or until there is a court decision holding that the 
patent is invalid or not infringed.56 
In addition to providing for an automatic thirty-month stay, the Hatch-
Waxman Act awards the first paragraph IV filer a 180-day period free 
from other generic competition.57 While the 180-day exclusivity period is 
in effect, the FDA is precluded from approving any other ANDA for the 
 
 
 49. 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) (2003). 
 50. 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) (2003). Alternatively, the ANDA applicant could 
“certify either that (1) the patent information has not been filed with the FDA; (2) the patent is expired; 
[or] (3) the patent will expire, identifying the expiration date . . . .” Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1297. “If 
the applicant certifies (1) or (2), FDA approval proceeds in regular fashion, see 21 U.S.C. 
§ 355(j)(5)(B)(i); if the applicant certifies (3), the application will not be approved until the date the 
relevant patent expires, see 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(b)(ii).” Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1297. 
 51. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(j)(5)(B) (2003).  
 52. See Bruce R. Genderson, Settlements in Hatch-Waxman Act Patent Litigation: Resolving 
Conflicting Intellectual Property and Antitrust Concerns, 3 SEDONA CONF. J. 43, 45 (2002) (“The 
statute treats the filing of the ANDA-IV certification as a technical act of infringement, thereby 
creating jurisdiction.”).  
 53. 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2003).  
 54. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 2d 188, 193 (E.D.N.Y. 
2003) (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)). After FDA approval, the ANDA filer may begin to market 
its generic drug. Id. However, if the patent on the pioneer drug has not yet expired, “the ANDA filer 
assumes the risk it might be found liable for infringing the pioneer manufacturer’s patent.” In re 
Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 166 F. Supp. 2d 740, 744 (E.D.N.Y. 2001).  
 55. 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2003). “The patent holder is, of course, free to sue the 
applicant for infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A) [the patent infringement statute] after the 
45-day window expires. The 30-month stay of FDA approval, however, will not be triggered.” Valley 
Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1298 n.5 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 56. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2000).  
 57. See generally 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2000). 
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drug in question.58 Prior to the 2003 amendments to the Hatch-Waxman 
Act, the exclusivity period was triggered by either the marketing of the 
generic drug by the first ANDA filer or a court decision finding the patent 
on the pioneer drug invalid or not infringed.59 The purpose of the 
exclusivity period is to serve as an incentive for generic manufacturers to 
challenge drug patents believed to be weak.60 
3. Manipulation of the Hatch-Waxman Act 
Even though the Hatch-Waxman Act has increased the availability of 
generic drugs,61 the statute’s complex provisions have rendered it 
vulnerable to manipulation.62 Specifically, both the thirty-month stay 
provision and the 180-day exclusivity period may be used to subvert the 
aims of the Hatch-Waxman Act.63 According to Congressman Henry 
Waxman, “The law has been turned on its head. We were trying to 
encourage more generics and through different business arrangements, the 
reverse has happened.”64 
The problem with the thirty-month stay of FDA approval is that 
pioneer drug companies have allegedly listed multiple patents of dubious 
merit in the Orange Book solely in order to make use of the automatic 
stay.65 Those who filed an ANDA for a particular drug were forced to 
make paragraph IV certifications for every patent listed in the Orange 
Book for that drug.66 With multiple patents, the patent-holding pioneer 
drug manufacturers could, and did, seek multiple thirty-month stays, 
delaying generic entry and the resulting lower prices.67 
Although the multiple thirty-month stay tactic pits a pioneer drug 
manufacturer against its natural enemy, a generic drug manufacturer, the 
 
 
 58. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 2d at 193. 
 59. Id. The triggering mechanism for the 180-day exclusivity period was amended by Title XI of 
Medicare Prescription Drug and Modernization Act of 2003. See infra Part II.A.4.  
 60. See Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1298 (11th Cir. 2003).  
 61. See supra Part I.  
 62. See Lobanoff, supra note 13, at 1337–38. 
 63. Burford, supra note 1, at 370.  
 64. Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Jeff Gerth, Keeping Down the Competition: How Companies Stall 
Generics and Keep Themselves Healthy, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2000, at A1.  
 65. Burford, supra note 1, at 370 (“The thirty-month automatic stay provision, intended to allow 
patent holders to sue potential infringers before they received FDA approval, proved manipulable by 
pioneer companies who listed multiple, meritless patents solely for their ability to trigger the automatic 
stay.”). 
 66. See Greene, supra note 27, at 319. 
 67. Id. at 313. Until the passage of the 2003 Amendments to the Hatch-Waxman Act, generic 
drug manufacturers were not able to challenge Orange Book listings. Id. at 318–19. 
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Hatch-Waxman Act may also cause collusion between the rivals.68 This is 
accomplished when a pioneer and generic drug manufacturer settle their 
patent infringement suit via an exit payment settlement. Although the 
terms of exit payment settlements vary, most of them exhibit a similar 
pattern.69  
First, the pioneer, patent-holding drug manufacturer files an 
infringement suit against a generic drug manufacturer who is about to 
make a generic version of the pioneer drug.70 The two parties then settle 
the infringement suit, with the generic drug manufacturer agreeing not to 
enter the market for the drug in question and to not challenge the pioneer 
drug manufacturer’s patent.71 In return, the pioneer drug manufacturer 
agrees to pay the generic drug manufacturer a substantial amount of 
money.72 As a result, “for a certain period of years [a] particular generic 
producer is disabled by the settlement agreement from entering the 
market.”73 
Furthermore, under the original Hatch-Waxman Act, if the generic 
drug manufacturer agrees to retain its 180-day exclusivity period,74 the 
FDA will not be able to approve subsequent paragraph IV ANDAs filed 
by other generic competitors and an “approval bottleneck” will ensue.75 
Even when the 180-day exclusivity period is not an issue, exit payment 
settlements by their very terms delay the entry of low-cost generic drugs 
into the market.  
4. 2003 Hatch-Waxman Amendments 
In response to the perceived problems with the Hatch-Waxman Act, 
President Bush signed into law the Access to Affordable Pharmaceuticals 
Act as Title XI of the Medicare Prescription Drug and Modernization Act 
of 2003 (Medicare Act).76 Based in part on a Federal Trade Commission 
 
 
 68. See Stolberg & Gerth, supra note 64.  
 69. Herbert Hovenkamp, Sensible Antitrust Rules for Pharmaceutical Competition, 39 U.S.F. L. 
REV. 11, 22–23 (2004).  
 70. Id. at 22. 
 71. Id.  
 72. Id.  
 73. Id.  
 74. See generally Lobanoff, supra note 13, at 1343 (“The first ANDA applicant to challenge a 
patented drug has the liberty to decline triggering the 180-day exclusivity period, which precludes the 
FDA from approving any subsequent generic challenger’s application.”).  
 75. Greene, supra note 27, at 319 (“Thus, the first ANDA IV filer, by deliberately delaying, or 
‘parking,’ its 180 days of exclusivity, may create a bottleneck that prevents other generic competitors 
from getting FDA approval.”). 
 76. Access to Affordable Pharmaceuticals Act, Pub. L. No. 108-173, Title XI, §§ 1101–1104, 
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study,77 Title XI of the Medicare Act was designed to “prevent needless 
delays in getting more affordable generic drugs to market.”78  
The Medicare Act contains several provisions amending the Orange 
Book listing procedures and the automatic thirty-month stay.79 Most 
importantly, the Medicare Act allows for only one thirty-month stay per 
ANDA.80 Also, when a generic manufacturer is sued for infringing a 
patent listed in the Orange Book, the generic manufacturer can 
counterclaim to correct or delete the patent information in the Orange 
Book.81  
The Medicare Act also attempts to prevent abuse of the 180-day 
exclusivity period. First, the 180-day exclusivity period now operates on 
a “use it or lose it” basis wherein the first ANDA filer is required “to use 
the 180-day exclusivity period within certain time constraints or forfeit 
the period.”82 Other circumstances that can lead to forfeiture include 
withdrawal of the application, amendment of the certification, and failure 
to obtain tentative marketing approval.83 Second, if the first paragraph IV 
ANDA filer forfeits the 180-day exclusivity period, no subsequentANDA 
filers are eligible for it;84 there is only one exclusivity period.85 Third, the 
 
 
1111–1123, 117 Stat. 2066 (2004); see generally Greene, supra note 27. 
 77. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN 
FTC STUDY (July 2002), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf (last visited Jan. 28, 
2006).  
 78. Greene, supra note 27, at 311.  
 79. Access to Affordable Pharmaceuticals Act, Pub. L. No. 108-173, Title XI, § 1101, 117 Stat. 
2066 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355). 
 80. Greene, supra note 27, at 334 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)). A patent holder can 
amend the Orange Book listing for the drug in question to add new patents, and can sue for 
infringement on these later patents, but no thirty-month stay would be triggered. Id. However, “pioneer 
pharmaceuticals will still be able to prevent competitors from marketing generic drugs, based on a 
patent that is listed after an ANDA, by seeking a traditional preliminary injunction.” Burford, supra 
note 1, at 383. 
 81. Access to Affordable Pharmaceuticals Act, § 1101 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. 
§ 355(j)(C)(ii)). The patent information can be deleted if the generic manufacturer can show that the 
patent claims neither the pioneer drug nor an approved method of using the drug. The generic 
manufacturer cannot, however, recover damages for a patent holder’s erroneous listing of a patent in 
the Orange Book. Moreover, generic manufacturers can only challenge an Orange Book listing as a 
counterclaim, not an affirmative cause of action. Id. 
 82. Greene, supra note 27, at 349. The Medicare Act also eliminates the 180-day “court decision 
trigger,” choosing instead to focus on the first generic marketing of the generic product. Id.  
 83. H.R. 1, 108th Cong., BILL SUMMARY & STATUS, Library of Congress Thomas Website, 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d108:HR00001:@@@D&summ2=m& (last visited Jan. 28, 
2006). 
 84. Access to Affordable Pharmaceuticals Act, § 1102(a)(2) (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. 
§ 355(j)(5)(D)(iii)). See also H.R. 1, 108th Cong., supra note 83 (observing that the Medicare Act 
“[p]rohibits other subsequent ANDA applicants from being permitted the 180-day exclusivity period if 
all first ANDA applicants forfeit.”). 
 85. Greene, supra note 27, at 350.  
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Hatch-Waxman Act now requires that exit payment settlements involving 
pioneer and generic drugs be filed with the Assistant Attorney General 
and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) for review.86 Filing these 
agreements with the FTC should not only lead to fewer blatantly 
anticompetitive agreements, but it also should make it easier for the FTC 
to detect wrongdoing. Prior to the Medicare Act, settlements between 
drug makers and their generic rivals were usually kept confidential.87  
The Medicare Act’s revisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act should help 
deter pioneer and generic drug manufacturers from using the 180-day 
exclusivity period to delay generic entry into the market indefinitely.88 
On the other hand, “[t]he complexity of the Hatch-Waxman regulatory 
scheme will inevitably invite creative methods of advancing the different 
interests of brand-name and generic manufacturers.”89 Consequently, 
antitrust issues continue to be of vital importance with respect to exit 
payment settlements.90 
B. Antitrust and Patent Law Overview 
Because the primary goal of antitrust law is to eliminate restraints on 
competition,91 Section 1 of the Sherman Act makes illegal “[e]very 
contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce 
. . . .”92 Although on its terms the Sherman Act prohibits every agreement 
“in restraint of trade,” the Supreme Court has long recognized that 
Congress intended to outlaw only unreasonable restraints,93 i.e., those 
which suppress or destroy, rather than regulate, competition.94 
Consequently, most antitrust claims are analyzed under the “rule of 
reason,” wherein the reasonableness of a restraint is judged by looking at 
 
 
 86. H.R. 1 (citing Pub. L. No. 108-173, Title XI, §§ 1112–13, 117 Stat. 2066 (2004)).  
 87. Stolberg & Gerth, supra note 64.  
 88. See Burford, supra note 1, at 385.  
 89. See Greene, supra note 27, at 354–55.  
 90. See id.  
 91. See PHILLIP AREEDA, LOUIS KAPLOW & AARON EDLIN, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS ¶ 130, at 37 
(6th ed. 2004) (citing statement of Senator Sherman, 12 CONG. REC. 2455ff (1890) (“This bill [the 
Sherman Act] does not seek to cripple combinations of capital and labor, the formation of partnerships 
or of corporations, but only to prevent and control combinations made with a view to prevent 
competition, or for the restraint of trade, or to increase the profits of the producer at the cost of the 
consumer.”)).  
 92. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).  
 93. See, e.g., State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997).  
 94. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (“The true test of legality is whether 
the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition, or 
whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition.”). 
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a variety of factors including “specific information about the relevant 
business, its condition before and after the restraint was imposed, and the 
restraint’s history, nature, and effect.”95 Under rule of reason analysis, the 
plaintiff in an antitrust case must first demonstrate that the restriction in 
question has an anticompetitive effect.96 Once an anticompetitive effect is 
demonstrated, the burden shifts to the defendant to offer a procompetitive 
justification for the restriction.97  
Assuming this occurs, the plaintiff has the option of rebutting the 
defendant’s claim98 or showing that the procompetitive justification is 
outweighed by the restraint’s anticompetitive effect.99 In addition, a 
plaintiff in an antitrust case must prove that the injury was “of the kind 
that the antitrust laws were designed to prevent.”100 Because a full-blown 
rule of reason analysis requires gathering detailed information,101 
proceeding under this theory often places a heavy evidentiary and 
financial burden on plaintiffs. 
Fortunately for antitrust plaintiffs, the rule of reason is not required in 
all cases. Certain restraints “have such predictable and pernicious 
anticompetitive effect, and such limited potential for procompetitive 
benefit, that they are deemed unlawful per se.”102 Generally, restraints are 
 
 
 95. Khan, 522 U.S. at 10. 
 96. See Nat’l Soc. of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 693 (1978) (beginning rule of 
reason analysis by finding that the agreement was anticompetitive). See also Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 
526 U.S. 756, 786 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (asking first whether 
the restrictions in question have the potential for genuine adverse effects on competition). 
 97. See United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, 59 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“[I]f a plaintiff successfully 
establishes a prima facie case under § 2 [of the Sherman Act] by demonstrating anticompetitive effect, 
then the monopolist may proffer a ‘procompetitive justification’ for its conduct.”). Although the 
framework used in the Microsoft case arose in a Sherman Act § 2 “monopolization” context, the court 
in Microsoft noted that its “balancing approach” was similar to the approach taken under the rule of 
reason. Id. In fact, “‘[i]t is clear . . . that the analysis under section 2 is similar to that under section 1 
regardless whether the rule of reason label is applied . . . .’” Id. (quoting Mid-Texas Commc’ns Sys., 
Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 615 F.2d 1372, 1389 n.13 (5th Cir.1980)).  
 98. See Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 59. 
 99. Id. 
 100. AREEDA, KAPLOW & EDLIN, supra note 91, ¶ 146, at 67–68. This is known as “antitrust 
injury,” and it requires that the plaintiff show “that it (1) suffers injury (or threatened injury) that is 
both (2) actually caused by the defendant’s illegal conduct and (3) of the kind that the antitrust laws 
were designed to prevent.” Id.  
 101. See supra text accompanying note 95.  
 102. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) (citing N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 
U.S. 1, 5 (1958)). Courts also apply what is known as the “quick look rule of reason.” See, e.g., Cal. 
Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999). However, the “categories of analysis of anticompetitive 
effect are less fixed than terms like ‘per se,’ ‘quick look,’ and ‘rule of reason . . . .’” Cal. Dental Ass’n, 
526 U.S. at 779. Rather, the “object is to see whether the experience of the market has been so clear, or 
necessarily will be, that a confident conclusion about the principal tendency of a restriction will follow 
from a quick (or at least quicker) look, in place of a more sedulous one.” Id. at 781. 
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per se illegal when experience shows that the rule of reason, if applied, 
would condemn the restraint.103 When the per se rule is applied, courts do 
not have to consider the intent behind the restraint, any procompetitive 
justifications for the restraint, or the actual competitive effect of the 
restraint.104 Classic examples of conduct subject to the per se rule include 
price fixing, division of markets, group boycotts, and some tying 
arrangements.105 Also subject to the per se rule are horizontal restraints 
on trade that involve agreements between competitors, which are 
generally regarded as the most anticompetitive form of restraint.106 
Because exit payment settlements between pioneer drug 
manufacturers and their generic competitors are horizontal agreements, 
such settlements likely would be per se illegal in the absence of 
countervailing considerations.107 The agreements are indisputably 
anticompetitive—one party exits or delays entering the market in 
exchange for a cash payment, decreasing the competition the remaining 
party faces.108 In addition, exit payment settlements are analogous to 
horizontal market allocation agreements,109 which are classic per se 
violations of the Sherman Act.110 
The analogy between exit payment settlements and per se illegal 
horizontal restraints is not perfect, however. Settlements in the Hatch-
Waxman Act context invariably involve patents, and their presence alters 
the antitrust analysis. Whereas the purpose of antitrust law is to foster 
competition, the intellectual property system attempts to stimulate 
invention by stifling competition via a government-sanctioned 
monopoly.111 To that end, patent holders have a right to exclude others 
 
 
 103. Khan, 522 U.S. at 10 (quoting Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc., 457 U.S. 332, 344 
(1982)).  
 104. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 906–07 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Nat’l Coll. 
Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 100 (1984)).  
 105. E.g., N. Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. at 5 (listing conduct deemed per se illegal).  
 106. See David A. Balto, Pharmaceutical Patent Settlements: The Antitrust Risks, 55 FOOD & 
DRUG L.J. 321, 327 (2000) (“Agreements between or among competitors and/or potential competitors, 
so-called ‘horizontal’ restraints, are regarded as the most straightforwardly anticompetitive category in 
consumer welfare terms.”). 
 107. See, e.g., Lobanoff, supra note 13, at 1339 (“Pharmaceutical companies engage in horizontal 
restraints of trade when they enter into agreements to abstain from competing in an important market 
area such as price, quality, or innovation, or in a specific product territory, or even refrain from all 
competition.”). 
 108. See generally In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d at 896. 
 109. In the case of an exit payment settlement, the pioneer drug manufacturer has allocated the 
entire market. 
 110. See United States v. Topco Assoc., 405 U.S. 596, 607–08 (1972).  
 111. AREEDA, KAPLOW & EDLIN, supra note 91, ¶ 282, at 343. If one takes a broader view, 
however, it is apparent that antitrust and intellectual property law both, “properly understood, seek to 
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from making, using, or selling the invention throughout the United 
States.112 The right to exclude gives patent holders the freedom to engage 
in activity that would otherwise violate the antitrust laws.113 For example, 
a patent holder “can grant exclusive territorial licenses carving up the 
United States among its licensees,” or “subdivide markets in ways other 
than territorial . . . .”114  
The immunity patent holders enjoy is not, however, unlimited.115 
Patent law does not extend a patent holder’s monopoly beyond its 
statutory right to exclude.116 Moreover, it is “well settled that the 
possession of a valid patent or patents does not give the patentee any 
exemption from the provisions of the Sherman Act beyond the limits of 
the patent monopoly.”117 The question in exit payment settlement cases, 
then, is determining where “the limits of the patent monopoly” lie.  
Further complicating the analysis of exit payment settlements is that 
the legal system generally encourages settlements.118 Not only are 
settlements beneficial to the litigants, but they also provide social benefits 
by reducing conflict and the burden on the courts.119 When patents are 
involved, a settlement may be particularly valuable, as patent litigation is 
often complex and time-consuming.120 Conversely, litigation regarding 
patent validity plays an important role in ensuring that “only truly worthy 
 
 
promote innovation and the general welfare, albeit through two somewhat different mechanisms—IP 
law by protecting the property rights and interests of (and thus financial returns to) inventors, antitrust 
law by combating restrictions on the competitive process that may harm consumers and slow 
innovation.” Abbott & Michel, supra note 20, at 2. It is also important to note that although it is 
common to speak of a patent as granting its holder a monopoly, one must distinguish between a patent 
“monopoly” and an economic monopoly. “A patent confers a monopoly in the sense of a right to 
exclude others from selling the patented product. But if there are close substitutes for the patented 
product, the patent “monopoly” is not a monopoly in a sense relevant to antitrust law.” Asahi Glass 
Co. v. Pentech Pharm., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 995 (N.D. Ill. 2003), appeal dismissed, 104 Fed. 
Appx. 178 (Fed. Cir. 2004).  
 112. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2000).  
 113. See Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1304–05 (11th Cir. 2003); 
Genderson, supra note 52, at 44 (“[I]t is settled that a restraint that results from a patent, without more, 
is not a violation of the antitrust laws.”).  
 114. Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1305.  
 115. See, e.g., Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1304 (“The exclusionary right cannot be exploited in 
every way . . . .”).  
 116. Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1067 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 117. United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 196–97 (1963) (quoting United States v. 
Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 277 (1942)).  
 118. Genderson, supra note 52, at 46.  
 119. AREEDA, KAPLAN & EDLIN, supra note 91, ¶ 293, at 363. 
 120. Genderson, supra note 52, at 46. But see Joseph F. Brodley & Maureen A. O’Rourke, 
Preliminary Views: Patent Settlement Agreements, ANTITRUST, Summer 2002, at 53 (“It is important 
to note, however, that the policy reasons favoring settlement of litigation generally may not be as 
strong in patent cases as in others.”).  
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inventions are granted publicly protected monopolies.”121 Therefore, 
courts must be wary of turning a blind eye to settlements that may 
sacrifice competitive values in the name of judicial efficiency.122 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Courts Assessing the Legality of Exit Payment Settlements Under the 
Antitrust Laws Should Undertake a Limited Inquiry Into the Merits of 
the Underlying Patents 
Because patents immunize parties from antitrust scrutiny only up to 
the limits of the patent monopoly,123 courts must determine where the 
limits of the patent monopoly lie. “It is well-settled that a patent holder’s 
protections are limited by the precise terms of the patent grant, and 
cannot be extended by agreement.”124 The “precise terms of the patent 
grant” are referred to as the scope of the patent, and patent scope limits 
the exclusionary value of the patent. But scope is not the whole story. The 
exclusionary value of a pharmaceutical patent is a function of two 
variables—“the scope of the patent and its chance of being held valid.”125 
Consequently, when a plaintiff alleges that a patent settlement between 
pioneer and generic drug manufacturers violates antitrust laws, the court 
 
 
 121. AREEDA, KAPLAN & EDLIN, supra note 91, ¶ 293, at 364. See also Abbott & Michel, supra 
note 20, at 3 (“Courts generally favor settlements as an efficient means to avoid litigation, but these 
public policy considerations do not mean that all settlements are presumptively efficient regardless of 
the cost.”).  
 122. See AREEDA, KAPLOW & EDLIN, supra note 91, ¶ 293, at 364 (“[W]e must think carefully 
about the competitive values that might be sacrificed by a settlement and how best to preserve them.”). 
 123. See supra Part II.B. 
 124. In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 352 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1296 (S.D. Fla. 2005).  
 125. Hovenkamp et al., supra note 20, at 1761 (emphasis added). See also Shapiro, Antitrust 
Limits to Patent Settlements, supra note 20, at 395 (“[A] patent is best viewed as a probabilistic 
property right. What the patent grant actually gives the patent holder is the right to sue to prevent 
others from infringing the patent.”). Accordingly, “the patent holder’s rights are calibrated according 
to the likelihood that the patent holder would win the patent litigation and the extent of exclusion that 
such a victory would permit.” Id. For a critique of the notion of “probabilistic property rights,” see 
McDonald, supra note 20, at 68. McDonald argues that “this theory of probabilistic patent rights is 
simply an exercise in assuming one’s answer. Its premise is contrary to already existing principles of 
antitrust and patent law, and its conclusion would radically reform legal principles of causation that 
have been in place for centuries.” Id. at 69. It is important to note that both Shapiro and McDonald 
emphasize “patent strength, which certainly includes an assessment of validity.” Shapiro, Antitrust 
Analysis of Patent Settlements Between Rivals, supra note 17, at 70. In any event, this Note is 
predicated upon the idea that the exclusionary power of a patent is a function of its scope and 
probability of being found valid or not infringed. 
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must consider the probable validity of the patents that were the subject of 
the settlement.126  
There is substantial agreement among commentators that as a 
theoretical matter an assessment of both patent scope and validity is 
necessary to determine the exclusionary value of a patent.127 However, 
there is lively disagreement among scholars as to how courts should 
practically go about making this assessment in the context of patent 
settlements.128 At one end of the spectrum, some authors believe that 
assessing patent validity and scope can be resolved only through patent 
litigation, and settlement precludes re-litigating infringement issues in a 
subsequent antitrust suit.129 Conversely, others suggest that a “trial within 
a trial” is necessary; the court in an antitrust suit involving exit payments 
must as a threshold matter determine whether the patent is valid130 or 
uninfringed before addressing “normal” antitrust issues.131 Herbert 
Hovenkamp, Mark Janis, and Mark Lemley argue that most patent 
settlements can be disposed of without an inquiry into the merits;132 
intellectual property issues are irrelevant if “(1) the agreement would be 
lawful under the antitrust laws even in the absence of any IP dispute, or 
(2) the agreement would be unlawful under the antitrust laws even if all 
the IP claims that are made were fully sustained.”133 In the remaining 
cases, “where the settlement agreement would constitute lawful use of the 
claimed IP right if an infringement claim was valid, but not if there were 
not valid IP right,”134 the authors advocate at least a limited inquiry into 
the merits of the underlying infringement suit, though it need not be a 
particularly searching inquiry.135 
 
 
 126. See Hovenkamp et al., supra note 20, at 1765; Shapiro, Antitrust Analysis of Patent 
Settlements Between Rivals, supra note 17, at 70 (“With patent settlements, the outcome of the patent 
litigation itself is central to an evaluation of future competition in the absence of the agreement.”).  
 127. Brodley & O’Rourke, supra note 120, at 53 (“[A]ny precise identification of the antitrust risk 
would require assessment of patent validity and scope.”). But cf. Abbott & Michel, supra note 20, at 
22 (“In sum, any analysis of whether a patentee’s exclusionary right includes the right to make 
exclusion payments and preempts antitrust scrutiny of those payments must taken into account all 
characteristics and features of patent policy, including the probabilistic nature of the patent right at the 
time of settlement.”). 
 128. See, e.g., supra note 20.  
 129. Brodley & O’Rourke, supra note 120, at 53.  
 130. See supra note 19. 
 131. See McDonald, supra note 20, at 70–71.  
 132. Hovenkamp et al., supra note 20, at 1725.  
 133. Id.  
 134. Id. at 1726.  
 135. See id. at 1759.  
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Besides further burdening the courts,136 having a court hearing an 
antitrust suit engage in a “trial within a trial” on the infringement issues 
of the settled patent litigation may chill the incentive for pioneer and 
generic drug manufacturers to enter into legitimate settlements.137 Parties 
settle in large part to save litigation costs, and there would be less 
incentive for settlement if the issues settled would have to be re-litigated 
as part of an antitrust suit.138 The incentive for parties to settle is also 
decreased by the prospect of treble damages and criminal sanctions if the 
settlement is later found to violate antitrust laws.139 Finally, if settlement 
options are stifled, pioneer drug manufacturers “may be less inclined to 
invest the research and development (R&D) costs associated with 
bringing new drugs to the market.”140 
Assuming that some limited inquiry into the validity of the underlying 
patents is necessary, factors need to be developed to allow courts to 
engage in such an inquiry without re-litigating the underlying patent 
dispute. One method would be to have courts look at the existence of exit 
payments themselves as a proxy for conducting a hearing on the validity 
of the underlying patent, or at least considering the presence of exit 
payments as a highly significant factor in the analysis of likely 
validity.141 This is attractive because the weaker the case for patent 
validity, the more a pioneer drug manufacturer would be willing to pay 
the generic manufacturer for delaying its entry into the market.142 The 
sheer magnitude of exit payments suggests that the patents involved were 
weak and likely to be declared invalid or uninfringed.143 In addition, exit 
 
 
 136. See infra note 203. 
 137. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 529 (2005) (“Above 
all, making the legality of a patent settlement agreement, on pain of treble damages, contingent on a 
later court’s assessment of the patent’s validity might chill patent settlements altogether.”).  
 138. Hovenkamp et al., supra note 20, at 1765 (noting that inquiry into the merits of IP disputes is 
time consuming and difficult, and “threatens to undo many of the benefits of settling the dispute in the 
first place”). 
 139. AREEDA, KAPLOW & EDLIN, supra note 91, ¶¶ 135–38, 143, at 45–50, 58–60.  
 140. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 2d at 206.  
 141. See, e.g., Hovenkamp et al., supra note 20, at 1759 (“In an antitrust challenge, a payment 
from a patentee to an infringement defendant for the latter’s exit from the market is presumptively 
unlawful, shifting the burden of proof to the infringement plaintiff.”); Shapiro, Antitrust Analysis of 
Patent Settlements Between Rivals, supra note 17, at 72 (“In short, large reverse payments create an 
inference of consumer harm and thus allow antitrust enforcers to avoid the complex task of showing 
directly that the patent in question was weak.”).  
 142. See Hovenkamp et al., supra note 20, at 1758 (“[T]he size of the expected exclusion 
payments are inversely related to the strength of the patentee’s case.”). 
 143. See, e.g., Abbott & Michel, supra note 20, at 14 (“A patentee would not make a substantial 
payment if it believed it could exclude the competition for that period solely on the basis of its 
patent.”); Hovenkamp et al., supra note 20, at 1758–59.  
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payment settlements in the context of Hatch-Waxman Act litigation are 
the “reverse” of normal patent settlements.144 In a “normal” patent 
settlement the alleged infringer would pay the patentee-plaintiff, and the 
plaintiff would drop the suit or perhaps license its invention to the 
defendant.145 Exit payment settlements, by reversing the flow of 
payments, suggest that the pioneer drug manufacturer is sharing its 
monopoly profits with its generic competitor in exchange for delayed 
market entry.146  
Nevertheless, looking at the presence and magnitude of an exit 
payment is only a substitute for directly assessing the validity of the 
patent. Neither the directional flow of the settlement payment nor its 
magnitude are perfectly correlated with the likelihood that the underlying 
patent is invalid; both are affected by factors unrelated to the underlying 
merits of the patent litigation.147 Furthermore, the Hatch-Waxman Act 
treats the mere filing of a paragraph IV ANDA as an act of patent 
infringement, meaning that the generic drug company can challenge the 
validity of the pioneer’s patent without subjecting itself to the risk of 
paying money damages that would be present if the generic manufacturer 
had “actually” infringed.148 Accordingly, “there is only one way for 
payments to ‘flow’—from the party . . . with everything to lose (the 
patent) and nothing to gain (no prospect of damages) to the party . . . with 
everything to gain (free entry) and nothing to lose (no exposure to 
damages).”149 Frameworks that focus solely on the exit payment may end 
up sacrificing accuracy in the name of ease. What is needed, then, is a test 
that allows a court to engage in a limited inquiry into the merits of a 
patent suit, but does so without unduly stifling Hatch-Waxman Act 
settlements. The court in In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust 
 
 
 144. See, e.g., McDonald, supra note 20, at 68. 
 145. See Crane, Exit Payments in Settlement of Patent Infringement Lawsuits: Antitrust Rules and 
Economic Implications, supra note 20, at 769 (“In an ordinary case of patent infringement, the 
patentee/plaintiff would usually collect from the infringer/defendant—not vice versa.”). 
 146. Id.  
 147. See Crane, Ease Over Accuracy in Assessing Patent Settlements, supra note 14, at 702 
“Standing alone, the directional flow of the settlement payment is a poor proxy for determining the ex 
ante likelihood that the plaintiff would prevail at trial and legally exclude the defendant.” Id. 
Moreover, “patentees look to settle patent infringement lawsuits for a variety of reasons, including out-
of-pocket litigation costs, unrelated to ‘the value of eliminating competition that the patentee could not 
expect ex ante to exclude after trial.’” Id. at 705 (quoting Hovenkamp, Janis & Lemley, supra note 20, 
at 1758). 
 148. See McDonald, supra note 20, at 69–70.  
 149. Id. at 70. 
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Litigation (“Terazosin”) recently applied a test that in certain situations 
has the potential to satisfy both requirements.150 
B. Terazosin Background 
1. Factual Background 
Terazosin revolved around Abbott Laboratories’ (“Abbott’s”) attempt 
to protect Hytrin, its brand-name version of terazosin hydrochloride, from 
generic competition.151 Hytrin is used to treat high blood pressure and 
certain other conditions,152 and is covered by several patents, including 
the 5,504,207 patent (“the ’207 patent”).153 This patent claimed a certain 
crystalline form of anhydrous terazosin hydrochloride.154  
In 1996, Geneva Pharmaceuticals (“Geneva”) filed paragraph IV 
ANDAs based on Hytrin. One ANDA was filed for the capsule form of 
terazosin hydrochloride and a second ANDA was filed for the tablet 
form.155 Abbott then filed an infringement suit alleging that Geneva’s 
tablet form of terazosin hydrochloride infringed the ’207 patent.156 Geneva 
conceded that its terazosin hydrochloride tablet infringed this patent,157 but 
it argued that the patent was invalid due to the “on-sale bar” doctrine.158 In 
 
 
 150. In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 352 F. Supp. 2d 1279 (S.D. Fla. 2005), 
enforcing Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 151. See id. at 1286. 
 152. Id. at 1286. Hytrin is also used to treat benign prostatic hyperplasia, “an enlargement of the 
prostate gland that surrounds the urinary canal.” Id.  
 153. Id. at 1289. 
 154. Id. Specifically, the ’207 patent claimed “a crystalline polymorph of anhydrous terazosin 
hydrochloride with a certain X-ray diffraction pattern (Form IV) and a process for the preparation of 
terazosin hydrochloride . . . .” Id.  
 155. Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1298–99 (11th Cir. 2003).  
 156. Id. at 1299. Abbott failed, however, to file an infringement suit based on Geneva’s capsule 
form of the drug. Id. In addition, Zenith Goldline Pharmaceuticals also filed ANDAs for terazosin 
hydrochloride, settled with Abbott, and was a defendant in the subsequent antitrust suit. In re 
Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 352 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1286 (S.D. Fla. 2005). Zenith, 
however, settled with the antitrust plaintiffs and is therefore not relevant to the antitrust analysis. Id. at 
1286 n.3. 
 157. In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 352 F. Supp. at 1289.  
 158. Id. at 1289–90. The “on-sale bar” is a defense to patent infringement based on the novelty 
requirement: if the claimed subject matter was “on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the 
date of the application for patent in the United States,” then the subject matter fails to meet the novelty 
requirement and the patent is invalid. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000). Here, Geneva claimed that sales of 
the patented form of terazosin hydrochloride were made in the early 1990s, more than one year before 
Abbott applied for the ’207 patent. In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 352 F. Supp. 2d at 
1290. In rebuttal, Abbott argued that although the sales occurred, the “on-sale bar” was not triggered 
because none of the purchasers knew that it was the patented form of terazosin hydrochloride that was 
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April 1998, Abbott and Geneva entered into the settlement agreement that 
gave rise to the subsequent antitrust suit.159  
The settlement agreement provided that Geneva was not to sell or 
distribute any pharmaceutical product containing a form of terazosin 
hydrochloride until the occurrence of any one of several conditions.160 The 
settlement agreement also required Abbott to pay Geneva $4.5 million 
each month starting on April 30, 1998, and ending when, and if, the 
district court entered a final appealable judgment that Geneva did not 
infringe the ’207 patent or that it was invalid. If there was a final 
appealable judgment in Geneva’s favor, Geneva would continue to abstain 
from producing a generic copy and Abbott would pay into an escrow 
account until the resolution of the appeal.161  
On September 1, 1998, after Abbott and Geneva entered into their 
settlement agreement, the district court granted summary judgment in 
Geneva’s favor in the patent infringement suit, holding that the ’207 patent 
was invalid due to the on-sale bar.162 Pursuant to the settlement agreement, 
Abbott then began to make its payments directly into the escrow 
account.163 Although the settlement agreement was designed to terminate 
automatically, Abbott and Geneva terminated it early, on August 13, 1999, 
in response to an FTC investigation.164 Geneva began marketing the 
 
 
being sold. That is, the early 1990s purchasers knew they were taking terazosin hydrochloride, but 
they did not know which form. Id. 
 159. In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 352 F. Supp. 2d at 1290. 
 160. Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1300 (11th Cir. 2003). The 
conditions included the expiring of Abbott’s ’532 patent, someone else introducing a generic terazosin 
hydrochloride drug, or Geneva obtaining a court judgment that its terazosin tablets and capsules did 
not infringe the ’207 patent. Id. This latter condition required a final judgment from which no further 
appeal could be taken, including petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court. Id. Geneva also agreed 
not to transfer or sell its rights under its ANDAs, including its right to the 180-day exclusivity period. 
Id.  
 161. See In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 352 F. Supp. 2d at 1291. 
 162. See id. at 1290.  
 163. See id. By the time the settlement agreement was terminated, Abbott had placed $49.5 
million into escrow. Id.  
 164. Absent FTC involvement, the settlement agreement would have terminated on January 10, 
2000, the date that the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari. In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust 
Litig., 352 F. Supp. 2d at 1290. Instead, Abbott and Geneva entered into consent decrees with the 
FTC. See In re Abbott Labs., http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/05/c3945.do.htm.  
The orders prohibited Abbott and Geneva from entering into NDA/ANDA (brand-generic) 
Agreements in which: (1) the ANDA First Filer (generic) producer is prohibited from 
relinquishing its 180-day marketing exclusivity rights, or (2) the ANDA First Filer (generic) 
producer agrees to refrain from developing any drug product that has potential for FDA 
approval and that is not the subject of a patent infringement court action. The companies were 
also required to obtain court approval for any agreements made in the context of an interim 
settlement of a patent infringement action that provided for payments to the ANDA First Filer 
(generic) in order to stay off the market, with advance notice to the Commission to allow it 
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capsule form of terazosin hydrochloride the same month and its tablet 
form of the drug approximately one year later.165 
2. Procedural Background of Antitrust Suit 
Almost two years after the settlement agreement was executed, a class 
of plaintiffs consisting of generic drug manufacturers, 
pharmacies/retailers, and interest groups166 sued Abbott and Geneva 
alleging that the settlement agreement was illegal under Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act.167 The district court agreed and held that the settlement 
agreement was per se illegal.168 On interlocutory appeal, the Eleventh 
Circuit reversed, primarily because the district court failed to take the 
exclusionary power of the patent into account in its decision.169 To guide 
the district court on remand, the appellate court stated that certain 
provisions of the settlement agreement were to be compared to the 
protections provided by a preliminary injunction and considered in light of 
 
 
time to present its views to the Court. Finally, the companies were ordered to give advance 
notice to the Commission before reaching a similar agreement in non-litigation contexts.  
Uche Ewelukwa, Patent Wars in the Valley of the Shadow of Death: The Pharmaceutical Industry, 
Ethics, and Global Trade, 59 U. MIAMI L. REV. 203, 261 (2005).  
 165. See Melissa R. Leuenberger-Fisher, Note, In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation: 
An Argument for the Rule of Reason, 24 BIOTECH. L. REP. 417, 419 (2005).  
 166. See Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1294 (11th Cir. 2003). The 
Lexis versions of the Valley Drug opinion list the counsel for the plaintiffs. The generic drug 
manufacturers mentioned were Louisiana Wholesale Drug Company and Valley Drug Company. Also 
suing Abbott and Geneva were Walgreens Co., Inc., Kroger Co., the Eckerd Corporation, and 
Albertson’s Inc., all of which are pharmacies and would presumably benefit from the lower drug prices 
that generic terazosin hydrochloride would bring. The AARP and the National Association of Chain 
Drug Stores also acted as amici in the case. Id.  
 167. See Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1301.  
 168. In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 164 F. Supp. 2d 1340, 1354 (S.D. Fla. 2000), 
rev’d sub nom. Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2003). The district 
court characterized the settlement agreement as a horizontal market allocation between competitors, 
allocating the entire U.S. market for terazosin drugs to Abbott, who shared its profits with other 
“cartel” members during the duration of the settlement agreement. Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1304. 
Moreover, the district court found that the purpose of the settlement agreement was to “dissuade[] 
Geneva and Zenith from marketing the first generic terazosin hydrochloride drugs in the United States 
for an indefinite period, eliminate[] the risk that either drug maker would sell or purchase the right to 
introduce such drugs in the interim, and enlist[] their potential cooperation in opposing or refusing to 
support other drug makers’ ANDAs.” In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 164 F. Supp. 2d 
at 1349. 
 169. Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1304. Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit held that “the appropriate 
analysis on remand will likely require an identification of the protection afforded by the patents and 
the relevant law and consideration of the extent to which the [settlement] Agreements reflect a 
reasonable implementation of these.” Id. at 1312. Also of significance, the Eleventh Circuit found that 
the ’207 patent may have allowed Abbott to obtain a preliminary injunction or stay pending appeal. Id. 
at 1305.  
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the likelihood of Abbott’s obtaining such protections.170 In addition, the 
Eleventh Circuit held that “[a]ny provisions of the [settlement] 
Agreement[] found to have effects beyond the exclusionary effects of 
Abbott’s patent may then be subject to traditional antitrust 
analysis . . . .”171 
On remand, the district court concluded that at the time the settlement 
agreement was entered into, Abbott would not have been able to receive a 
preliminary injunction, and had litigation proceeded on the ’207 patent, it 
would have been found invalid due to the on-sale bar.172 Having 
established that the provision of the settlement agreement in question 
exceeded the exclusionary scope of the ’207 patent,173 the court applied 
“normal” antitrust principles and again found the provision to be per se 
illegal.174 
C. Framework Developed in In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust 
Litigation 
The district court reached its conclusion by applying a test based on the 
Eleventh Circuit’s instructions and the writings of Professor 
Hovenkamp.175 Hovenkamp was read as urging a limited inquiry into the 
merits of the infringement suit, and the district court created a multi-factor 
test to determine whether the challenged provision of the settlement 
agreement was “a reasonable implementation of the exclusionary potential 
of the ’207 patent.”176 First, the district court examined the exclusionary 
scope of the patent and the extent of the protections afforded by it.177 The 
 
 
 170. Id. at 1312.  
 171. Id. The court found application of the rule of reason inappropriate, “as the anticompetitive 
effects of exclusion cannot be seriously debated.” Id. at 1311. Rather, “what is required here is an 
analysis of the extent to which antitrust liability might undermine” the incentives of the patent system. 
Id. Interestingly, the court also rejected the view that exit payments alone are sufficient for a finding of 
antitrust liability: “it is difficult to infer from the size of the payments alone that the infringement suits 
lacked merit.” Id.  
 172. See In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 352 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1306 (S.D. Fla. 
2005).  
 173. Id. at 1310.  
 174. See id. at 1314. At this point in the litigation, the plaintiffs had “narrowed their Section One 
claims to a single provision of the Agreement—the prohibition of Geneva’s marketing its generic 
terazosin products between the September 1, 1998, district court judgment in the ’207 patent litigation 
and the Federal Circuit’s mandate on August 12, 1999 . . . .” Id. at 1294.  
 175. See id. at 1295. 
 176. Id. Specifically, the district court found itself obligated to engage in “at least a limited inquiry 
into the merits of the parties’ respective positions regarding the application of the ‘on-sale’ bar and the 
validity of the ’207 patent, viewed as of the date on which the Agreement was entered into.” Id.  
 177. In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 352 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1299 (S.D. Fla. 2005) 
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second step was to evaluate the likely outcome of the patent litigation, 
looking specifically at the likelihood that Abbott would have been able to 
receive injunctive relief on the date the settlement was entered into.178 
Third, the district court looked at whether, in light of applicable law and 
policy considerations, the settlement agreement “represented a reasonable 
implementation” of the patent’s protections.179 Any provision that failed to 
meet the three-part test was subjected to traditional antitrust analysis.180 
1. Exclusionary Scope of the Patent 
Under the first part of the Terazosin test, a court must consider the 
exclusionary value of the patent, which is a function of “the scope of the 
patent and its chance of being held valid.”181 In practice, however, the 
focus, at least in Terazosin, is on the “legal scope” of the patent, which is 
delineated by its claims.182 The analysis of the likely validity of the patent 
is reserved for the second step of the Terazosin test.183 In essence, the first 
part of the Terazosin test acts as a screening mechanism that weeds out 
settlement provisions that are immediately subject to antitrust scrutiny 
because the patent is irrelevant.184 For example, a provision in a settlement 
agreement that prevents a generic drug manufacturer from marketing 
drugs that the pioneer drug manufacturer has not patented would fail to 
pass muster under this first prong of the Terazosin test.185 In Terazosin, the 
 
 
(“The starting point for the Court’s analysis on remand is to define the exclusionary scope of the ’207 
patent.”).  
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. at 1295–96 (“[T]he Court next must determine whether the settlement represented a 
reasonable implementation of the protections afforded by the ’207 patent, in light of the applicable 
law, the then-pending litigation, and the general policy justifications supporting settlements of 
intellectual property disputes.”). 
 180. Id. at 1296. 
 181. Id. (quoting Hovenkamp et al., supra note 20, at 1761). 
 182. Id. at 1297. In patent law, the extent of exclusion is governed by the claims set out in the 
patents specification. As Judge Giles Rich famously stated, “[T]he name of the game is the claim.” 
DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 73 (3d ed. 2004).  
 183. In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 352 F. Supp. 2d at 1299 (“[A]ny definitive 
construction of the exclusionary scope of the patent requires at least a limited assessment of the 
underlying patent infringement case. Therefore, the second step of the . . . analysis focuses on the 
likely outcomes of the patent litigation that was pending at the time the parties entered into the 
Agreement.” (emphasis added)).  
 184. The “exclusionary scope” prong of the Terazosin test is functionally similar to the threshold 
step in the Hovenkamp et al. framework, supra note 20, which places exit payment settlement cases 
into three categories, only one of which requires “special” analysis due to the presence of intellectual 
property. Hovenkamp et al., supra note 20, at 1724–25.  
 185. For example, the district court noted that “the restriction on Geneva’s marketing of any 
terazosin hydrochloride product appears to extend well beyond the protections of the patent . . . .” In re 
Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 352 F. Supp. 2d at 1297. The district court never reached this 
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district court did not find it necessary to analyze the terms of the patent’s 
claims, primarily because they were not at issue in the case.186 
2. Likely Outcome of the Underlying Patent Litigation 
The second prong of the Terazosin test “focuses on the likely outcomes 
of the patent litigation that was pending at the time the parties entered into 
the Agreement.”187 The provision of the settlement agreement at issue 
delayed market entry by Geneva until appellate determination of patent 
validity, and was therefore similar to a preliminary injunction or appellate 
stay.188 In order to obtain a preliminary injunction, the party seeking such 
relief must demonstrate “a reasonable likelihood of success on the 
merits.”189 Moreover, the Terazosin test requires a court to look at the 
situation as of the date of the settlement.190 Theoretically, this prevents a 
court from taking into account whether another court, subsequent to the 
settlement, had declared the patent invalid or not.191 To avoid antitrust 
liability under the second prong of the Terazosin test, antitrust defendants 
must show that at the time of the settlement agreement, it was “more 
probable than not” that the patent would be declared not invalid.192 In 
Terazosin, the district court found that at the time Geneva and Abbott 
entered into the settlement agreement, it was not probable that Abbott 
would win the infringement suit;193 the on-sale bar would have rendered 
the ’207 patent invalid.194  
 
 
issue, however, because the only provision of the settlement agreement challenged was “the 
prohibition of Geneva’s marketing its generic product until after appellate resolution of the ’207 
patent,” which implicated only “the temporal breadth of the patent’s provisions.” Id.  
 186. See In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 352 F. Supp. 2d at 1297. 
 187. See id. at 1299. 
 188. See id. Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit required such a comparison: “the ’207 patent may 
have allowed Abbott to obtain preliminary injunctive relieve or a stay of an adverse judgment pending 
appeal . . . .” Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1305 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 189. In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 352 F. Supp. 2d at 1302. 
 190. See id. at 1303.  
 191. See id. The impetus for assessing the legality of the settlement by looking at the time the 
agreement was entered into is explained by the Eleventh Circuit.  
[E]xposing settling parties to antitrust liability for the exclusionary effects of a settlement 
[agreement] . . . merely because the patent is subsequently declared invalid would undermine 
the patent incentives. Patent litigation is too complex and the results too uncertain for parties 
to accurately forecast whether enforcement of the exclusionary right through settlement will 
expose them to treble damages if the patent immunity were destroyed by the mere invalidity 
of the patent. 
Id. at 1308. 
 192. Id. at 1301. Abbott and Geneva had unsuccessfully argued that they only need prove a 
“reasonable possibility” of success in getting a preliminary injunction. Id. at 1300.  
 193. Id. (“Because the Court concludes that Abbott’s challenge to Geneva’s “on-sale bar” 
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3. Reasonable Implementation of the Patent’s Protections 
“Having concluded that Abbott was not likely to qualify for a 
preliminary injunction as of April 1, 1998,”195 the district court determined 
that the challenged provision of the settlement agreement was not a 
reasonable implementation of the protections afforded by the ’207 
patent.196 It is unclear from the district court’s opinion exactly what 
applying the “reasonable implementation” prong of the Terazosin test 
entails; the district court merely looked at the proffered procompetitive 
justifications for the settlement agreement and found them wanting.197 
Functionally, the third prong of the Terazosin test is similar to the second 
step of the rule of reason where the defendant offers procompetitive 
justifications for the conduct shown to have anticompetitive effects.198  
IV. PROPOSAL 
A. Strengths and Weaknesses of the Terazosin Test 
The major benefit of the Terazosin test is that it incorporates into its 
antitrust analysis an inquiry into the underlying validity of the patents 
involved.199 This is important because, as discussed previously, a valid 
patent gives its holder the power to exclude others and may therefore save 
 
 
argument . . . was weak and unlikely to result in a District Court finding that the ’207 patent was valid, 
it follows that Abbott was unlikely to obtain a preliminary injunction to keep Geneva off the market 
. . . .”). 
 194. Id. Although the court in Terazosin stated that it ignored that the district court in the original 
patent infringement suit found the ’207 patent invalid in September 1998, at least one scholar has 
found this claim dubious. “At the very least, the district court in the antitrust case appears to have 
failed to adhere to its own mandate that it ‘may not rely on the District Court’s analysis’ of the ’207 
patent . . . [in the infringement case] or on its ultimate conclusion that the patent was invalid under the 
on-sale bar.” Leuenberger-Fisher, supra note 165, at 423.  
 195. In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 352 F. Supp. 2d at 1307.  
 196. See id.  
 197. See id. at 1307–10. The district court rejected the arguments that the settlement agreement 
was reasonably necessary because: (1) the parties were operating against a backdrop of risk and 
uncertainty, and immediate launch of the generic product would have created legal and financial risks; 
(2) the challenged provision was ancillary to an agreement whose effect was to dispose of litigation 
and enhance competition; and (3) there was a high rate of reversal by the Federal Circuit of district 
court patent judgments. Id. at 1307–08. Most important to the district court was that the settlement 
agreement did not terminate the entire litigation but rather delayed entry while litigation proceeded. In 
the district court’s view, this negated the efficiency and procompetitive justifications associated with 
settling disputes. Id. at 1308.  
 198. See supra Part II.B. Similarly, the first two prongs of the Terazosin test can be analogized to 
the initial inquiry under the rule of reason that seeks to ascertain whether the defendant’s conduct has 
anticompetitive effects. See supra Part II.B. 
 199. See supra Part III.C.2.  
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an exit payment settlement from antitrust condemnation.200 The court in 
Terazosin could have simply concluded that the size of the exit payments 
involved in the settlement agreement showed that Abbott had no faith in 
the validity of its patents, and therefore the patents likely were invalid and 
the settlement collusive.201 Certainly this would have been easier on the 
court than looking into patent law issues in an antitrust suit.202 Instead, the 
Terazosin test represented an attempt to take on a heavy administrative 
burden in order to get the most accurate result possible. 
The Terazosin test does not, however, mean that a court must engage in 
a full patent trial during an antitrust case.203 The Terazosin test only 
requires that a court determine whether it was more likely than not that the 
pioneer drug manufacturer would succeed in the infringement suit.204 This 
preliminary injunction-like analysis is likely less burdensome on the courts 
than a full patent trial. Moreover, the less searching inquiry promulgated 
in Terazosin respects the idea that parties should be able to settle without 
undue interference by the courts.205 It does this by requiring, not that the 
parties enter into the “best” settlement in terms of the public interest, but 
rather that they enter into a “reasonable” settlement—a settlement based 
on a patent more likely than not valid to begin with.206  
In addition, the Terazosin test attempts to retain the incentive for 
pioneer and generic drug manufacturers to settle. This is accomplished by 
requiring that courts look at the likelihood of patent validity at the time of 
the settlement agreement.207 This puts the court in the position that the 
parties were in when they settled, which is more fair to the settling parties 
than if a court scrutinized their behavior with the benefit of hindsight.208 
 
 
 200. See supra Part III.A and note 137.  
 201. See supra Part III.A. See also Brodley & O’Rourke, supra note 120, at 55 (“The payment or 
giving of any other consideration to the generic manufacturer should be at least presumptively 
unlawful (if not per se unlawful), with the burden of proof on the parties to justify the payment.”). 
 202. See, e.g., Brodley & O’Rourke, supra note 120, at 53 (“The alternative of assessing probable 
validity and infringement in an antitrust proceeding fails to prove a tractable or predictive legal 
standard.”). 
 203. Of course, it is not unheard of for a court to engage in a trial within a trial. “Where a plaintiff 
alleges malpractice in litigation, the ‘but for’ test requires her to prove a ‘case within a case.’” 
STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS 638 (7th ed. 2005).  
 204. See supra Part III.C.2. 
 205. See supra Part II.B (discussing the legal system’s bias in favor of settlement).  
 206. An unreasonable settlement would be one where the exit payments are used to keep a weak 
patent from being invalidated. By engaging in preliminary injunction-like analysis, the Terazosin test 
is designed to prevent this from occurring.  
 207. See In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 352 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1303 n.21 (S.D. 
Fla. 2005) (“The Court, therefore, is not considering the subsequent invalidity of the patent, but rather 
is assessing the chances, gauged as of April 1, 1998, of Abbott succeeding in defending its patent.”).  
 208. See supra text accompanying note 191.  
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Under the Terazosin test, parties do not have to worry as much about a 
scenario wherein: (1) the parties settle a patent infringement suit; (2) a 
court subsequently declares the patent invalid; (3) smelling blood, antitrust 
plaintiffs sue, arguing that the settlement was anticompetitive because 
there was no valid patent involved; and (4) the antitrust court 
automatically agrees with the antitrust plaintiffs because the court in the 
patent case ultimately found the patent invalid.  
This is not to say that the Terazosin test is without flaws.209 There is 
the possibility that having antitrust courts revisit the merits of patent 
litigation could destroy the certainty and predictability that settlements are 
meant to provide.210 The settling parties may have “simply traded the 
uncertainty of the outcome of the patent litigation, based on the patent 
merits, for the uncertainty of the outcome of the antitrust litigation, based 
again on the patent merits.”211 The prospect of treble damages, a common 
remedy in antitrust cases, based on a later court’s assessment of a patent’s 
 
 
 209. See In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, 363 F. Supp. 2d 514 (E.D.N.Y. 
2005). The court implied that by looking into the validity of the ’207 patent, the Terazosin court 
misinterpreted the Eleventh Circuit’s instructions in Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 
1294, 1305 (11th Cir. 2003). In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, 363 F. Supp. 2d 
at 526 (“It is not certain that the district court correctly interpreted the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion, and 
indeed the Eleventh Circuit seems to have expressed some doubt on that point in an unrelated 
opinion.” (citing Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005))). While the court in 
Valley Drug did state that “good faith procurement [of a patent] furnishes a complete defense to an 
antitrust claim,” it did so only in the context of explaining the Supreme Court’s rationale in Walker 
Process Equipment Co. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965). Valley Drug, 344 
F.3d at 1307. More importantly, the court mentioned time and again the “potential exclusionary power 
of the patent” and the “protection afforded by the patents.” Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1311–12. The 
Eleventh Circuit required the district court to compare the settlement agreement to a preliminary 
injunction; presumably, the Eleventh Circuit was aware that obtaining a preliminary injunction 
requires showing a likelihood of success on the merits, and therefore an inquiry into the validity of the 
’207 patent. Finally, the Eleventh Circuit, in Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, noted that the FTC 
“cavalierly dismissed our holding in Valley Drug . . . [by] stating that a determination of the merits of 
the underlying patent disputes was ‘not supported by law or logic.’” Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 
402 F.3d 1056, 1068 n.18 (11th Cir. 2005). This strongly suggests that the Eleventh Circuit did 
approve some sort of inquiry into the validity of the patents involved in a Hatch-Waxman exit payment 
settlement, contrary to what the court in In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation 
implied. 
 210. See Abbott & Michel, supra note 20, at 33. For instance, there is the possibility that parties 
will settle, a later court then finds the patent valid, but during a subsequent antitrust suit the court 
applies the Terazosin test and finds that the patent likely was invalid based on the information 
available at the time of the settlement. The result would be that the settling parties would be liable for 
damages in the antitrust suit when the patent was not declared invalid. This would be highly unfair to 
the settling parties, and liability in such a case would almost certainly chill patent settlements. Of 
course, the likelihood of such a scenario occurring may not be high, as antitrust plaintiffs are unlikely 
to incur the litigation costs associated with challenging a settlement when one court has already 
refused to hold that the patent involved invalid. 
 211. Id. at 33–34. 
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validity may also make parties in patent suits wary of settling.212 
Moreover, patents are presumed valid, and inquiring into their validity in 
an antitrust suit may undermine this presumption.213 Furthermore, “any 
antitrust rule must be sensitive to issues of administrability and 
uncertainty,” and the cost of inquiring into the validity of the patent may 
be high for an antitrust court even if the analysis is limited.214 
B. The Terazosin Test Should Be Applied Only in Limited Circumstances  
One way to solve some of the problems mentioned above is to carefully 
limit the situations where the Terazosin test is applied. A court in an 
antitrust case concerning the legality of exit payment settlements should 
only inquire into patent issues when absolutely necessary; effectively 
screening cases will get rid of cases where the settlement’s legality is 
independent of the patent’s validity or lack thereof.215 Moreover, because 
the Terazosin test looks at whether a pioneer drug manufacturer could 
have obtained a preliminary injunction,216 the test will be most useful 
when applied to settlements that are analogous to preliminary injunctions; 
settlements that delay, rather than completely prevent, generic entry into 
the market. In addition, the Terazosin test will be easier to apply when the 
antitrust court is faced with relatively simple patent law issues and facts.217 
As the complexity of the patent issues increases, so too will the 
administrative burden the Terazosin test places on antitrust courts, making 
the test less useful in those situations.  
 
 
 212. See, e.g., In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d at 530. 
Moreover, “[a]ntitrust remedies that unnecessarily deprive defendants of patent rights or that reduce 
the value of prospective patenting are likely to do more harm than good to the long run performance of 
the industry.” Hovenkamp, supra note 69, at 12. 
 213. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d at 529. But see Abbott & 
Michel, supra note 20, at 19 (characterizing the presumption of validity as “simply a procedural device 
for allocating the burden of proof to an accused infringer”). Accordingly, the presumption has “‘no 
separate evidentiary value’ in patent litigation and it should not be accorded that value in antitrust 
litigation.” Id. 
 214. Hovenkamp et al., supra note 20, at 1732.  
 215. See supra Part III.C.1 and accompanying notes.  
 216. See supra Part III.C.2. 
 217. For instance, the Terazosin case itself “presented none of the complicated claims construction 
issues that mark some patent infringement actions. The focus, instead, was on a single legal issue 
regarding the validity of the ’207 patent in light of Geneva’s challenge based on the ‘on-sale bar.’” In 
re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 352 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1302 (S.D. Fla. 2005).  
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C. The Terazosin Test Should Be Incorporated Into the Rule of Reason 
Another way to increase the utility of the Terazosin test would be to 
incorporate it into the rule of reason. Although the Eleventh Circuit 
suggested that application of the rule of reason would be inappropriate in 
exit payment settlement cases,218 the Terazosin test is in some ways very 
similar to the rule of reason.219 The first two prongs of the Terazosin test, 
which try to ascertain the exclusionary power of the patent, represent an 
attempt to determine if the exit payment settlement was anticompetitive.220 
Similarly, the first step of the rule of reason requires a plaintiff to show 
that the challenged conduct has an anticompetitive effect.221  
If the Terazosin test were combined with the rule of reason, a plaintiff 
challenging the legality of an exit payment settlement in an antitrust suit 
first would have to prove that the pioneer drug manufacturer was unlikely 
to have succeeded on the merits of the patent infringement suit. A full 
patent trial would not be necessary; “the court could require the parties to 
submit affidavits and hold a hearing similar to a preliminary injunction 
hearing. If, based on a ‘quick look,’ the court concluded that the patent 
infringement claim was likely to succeed, the exit payment settlement 
should be approved without further inquiry.”222 On the other hand, if the 
“quick look raised significant doubts regarding the validity of the patent,” 
a more thorough adjudication of the likely validity could be performed.223 
Assuming that the antitrust plaintiff provides sufficient proof of patent 
invalidity or non-infringement, the burden would shift to the antitrust 
defendants (the pioneer and generic drug manufacturers) to show that the 
exit payment settlement had procompetitive justification, as in the “second 
step” of the rule of reason,224 or the third prong of the Terazosin test.225 
Incorporating the Terazosin test into the rule of reason would produce 
several benefits. First, by giving antitrust defendants a chance to provide 
procompetitive justifications for the exit payment settlements, the 
Terazosin test/rule of reason combination will help prevent undue chilling 
of patent settlements. Parties engaging in exit payment settlements would 
 
 
 218. Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1310 n.27 (11th Cir. 2003).  
 219. See supra note 198 and accompanying text. 
 220. See supra Parts III.B.1–2 and note 198.  
 221. See supra Part II.B. 
 222. Crane, Exit Payments in Settlement of Patent Infringement Lawsuits: Antitrust Rules and 
Economic Implications, supra note 20, at 785. 
 223. Id.  
 224. See supra Part II.B.  
 225. See supra Part III.C.3.  
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not face the specter of being subjected to antitrust liability, and treble 
damages, solely because another court happened to find the patent invalid. 
The defendants would always have a chance to show that there were 
procompetitive justifications for the settlement, such as that it was 
ancillary to a legitimate agreement.226 Second, placing the burden of proof 
on the antitrust plaintiffs acknowledges that patents are presumed valid;227 
patent-holding parties should not lose this presumption merely because 
they are being sued for an antitrust violation.228 Finally, the courts have 
applied the rule of reason for decades and it is an entrenched part of 
antitrust law.229 Although familiarity may often breed contempt, courts are 
accustomed to the rule of reason and may be more likely to apply the 
Terazosin test if it is incorporated therein. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The test applied by the court in In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust 
Litigation goes a long way toward striking the proper balance between the 
goals of antitrust law and intellectual property law. It does so by 
recognizing that patent settlement agreements only harm consumers if it 
turns out that the underlying patent was invalid or uninfringed, meaning 
that generic entry would have occurred absent settlement.230 Therefore, a 
principled analysis of the legality of Hatch-Waxman settlements must 
inquire into the merits of the underlying patent infringement suit in some 
way.231 The Terazosin test makes such an inquiry, and does so in a way 
designed to lessen the chilling effect that antitrust scrutiny may have on 
patent settlements.  
 
 
 226. See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 282 (6th Cir. 1898) (“[N]o 
conventional restraint of trade can be enforced unless the covenant embodying it is merely ancillary to 
the main purpose of a lawful contract . . . .”), aff’d 175 U.S. 211 (1899).  
 227. See supra note 213.  
 228. See, e.g., Crane, Ease Over Accuracy in Assessing Patent Settlements, supra note 14, at 709 
(“One does not envy the patentee’s general counsel who has to inform senior management that by 
settling a patent infringement lawsuit they will presumptively become criminals and subject to fines 
and imprisonment unless they can persuade a jury that they likely would have won the patent 
infringement lawsuit anyway.”). Granted, the burden of proof is usually placed on the party in the best 
position to provide such proof, which in the case of antitrust challenges to Hatch-Waxman settlements 
would be the pioneer and generic drug manufacturers. Id. However, it makes sense to place the burden 
on the antitrust plaintiffs when they are the ones challenging the settlement and the validity of the 
patent. 
 229. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) (applying standard of 
reasonableness).  
 230. See supra Part III.A. 
 231. See supra Part III.A.  
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At first glance, however, it may seem that the Terazosin test is tilted 
too heavily in favor of the pioneer and generic drug manufacturers rather 
than consumers, especially in light of the suggestions provided for refining 
the test.232 This tilt is especially worrisome given the high cost of drugs in 
this country.233 Yet the Terazosin test gets at the worst kinds of 
settlements—those that simply mask weak patents and prevent generic 
entry into the market. Under the Terazosin test, drug companies that enter 
into exit payment settlements based on weak patents do so at the risk of 
treble damages. To go any further, though, may interfere with the 
incentives created by the patent system; pioneer drug manufacturers may 
be less likely to invest in new research if they feel that they will not be 
able to protect their investment by settling infringement cases.234 Stringent 
antitrust scrutiny of Hatch-Waxman Act settlements could lead to more 
low-cost generic drugs now, but potentially decreased research into new 
drugs in the future. On the other hand, granting drug companies carte 
blanche when it comes to settling patent infringement suits may lead to 
revolutionary drugs in the future, but few affordable generic drugs now. 
To put it very broadly, the choice is between low-cost generic drugs now, 
or pricey innovative drugs in the future. The Terazosin test balances these 
concerns, allowing consumers to have the best of both worlds. 
Joel Graham* 
 
 
 232. See supra Part IV.  
 233. See supra Part I. 
 234. See, e.g., Shapiro, Antitrust Limits to Patent Settlements, supra note 20, at 392 (“The lion’s 
share of patent disputes are settled rather than litigated to a resolution in court. Lanjouw and 
Schankerman (2002) find that some 95% of patent lawsuits are settled prior to a court judgment.”) 
(citing J.O. Lanjouw & M. Schankerman, Characteristics of Patent Litigation: A Window on 
Competition, 32 RAND J. ECON 129, 129–51 (2001)).  
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